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Education and opportunity: 
Is the UK departing from a common tradition?
Sir John Cass’s Foundation Lecture 
read 18 March 2014
LINDSAY PATERSON
Fellow of the Academy
Abstract: There is an assumption in public debate that Scotland and England are 
drifting apart in social policy, whatever the outcome of the referendum in Scotland in 
September 2014 on whether Scotland should become an independent country. Three 
broad examples of policy divergence in education are discussed to examine the claim—
in connection with student finance in higher education, with the structure of second-
ary education, and with the school curriculum. It is concluded that the apparent 
divergence owes more to rhetoric than to the reality of policy, of public attitudes or 
of social experience. Despite the origins of a shared educational philosophy in the 
post-war welfare state, and despite the partisan strife of current politics, a weakening 
of that state through greater Scottish autonomy does not in itself  signal an end to the 
project of common welfare.
Keywords: Education, welfare state, universalism, Scotland, England, curriculum, 
student finance, school governance.
INTRODUCTION
It has become the common-sense view of public debate recently that devolution has 
made the UK less united even well in advance of the referendum on Scottish indepen-
dence in September 2014. The Economist, in November 2013, said that ‘even if  
Scotland votes to stay in the United Kingdom, the union is fraying’. Devolution had 
already disrupted the common social experience of the UK so profoundly that this 
process ‘appears not just irreversible but unstoppable’. Steve Richards, in the Guardian, 
in August 2013, made a similar point, having spent a few days at the Edinburgh 
Festival:
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there may be no divorce [in the referendum], but devolution combined with a right-
wing Westminster government is moving our nations in separate directions. . . . In its 
political culture and its powers to define what form that culture takes, Scotland is 
already so incomparably different from England that a form of separation is taking 
place in front of our eyes. (Richards 2013)
Talking to a mixed audience of English and Scots, he said, was now like addressing a 
mixture of ‘Americans and Swedes’.
The Scottish journalist Iain Macwhirter has summed up what he sees as the impli-
cations for the very nature of the state and society:
England is dismantling the traditional welfare state through marketisation of the 
NHS, welfare caps and free schools, while Scotland retains faith in the monolithic 
health service, social security and universal comprehensive education. (Macwhirter 
2013)
If  Scotland were to become independent, he went on, it would be likely to ‘evolve into 
a relatively high-tax, high-spend oil-rich Nordic state within the European Union, 
emulating Denmark or Finland. England may seek its own form of independence, 
probably leaving the EU to become a finance-led market economy with low taxation 
and diminished social protections.’
Such perceptions that Scotland is already profoundly different contribute sharply 
to the debate about Scottish independence, although the political disputes in Scotland 
itself  tend to be about what the most appropriate version of a left-wing response 
should be to such divergence, since the main partisan conflict is between two large left-
of-centre parties, the Scottish National Party and the Labour Party (What Scotland 
Thinks website 2014). Reflections on a common British welfare state have under-
pinned the most sociologically well-informed of the contributions from both sides of 
that debate, politicians asking whether the shared project of a common welfare state 
is any longer viable. Opponents of independence, notably the former UK Labour 
prime minister Gordon Brown, regret this loss of common purpose. In a speech in 
summer 2012, Mr Brown celebrated what he called ‘a community of values that cuts 
right across the United Kingdom’, and said that this shared commitment would be 
lost if  Scotland votes to ‘break up the Union’ (Brown 2012, developed more fully by 
Brown 2014). Supporters of independence, by contrast, argue that the only way to 
recover the old welfare-state ethic is to make Scotland diverge even further from 
England. For example, the deputy first  minister of Scotland, the SNP politician 
Nicola Sturgeon, said, in 2012, that ‘the  creation of the welfare state played an over-
whelming role in giving the union a new purpose,’ replacing the empire that had cre-
ated a union out of disparate nations: ‘Britain lost the colony of India, but we all 
gained a new territory in the shape of free health care and social protection from 
cradle to grave. Alongside the BBC, these things began to define Britishness’ (Sturgeon 
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2012). These shared institutions, she said, had now been so much undermined by what 
she referred to as ‘the Westminster system of government’ that Scotland could retain 
them only by becoming politically independent. Thus it was not Scotland that was 
breaking away from the old Britishness but rather governments in London.
There is some irony here, to which we shall return, since essentially what Ms Sturgeon 
and others are arguing is that to retain what might be characterised as British values of 
the past it is necessary for Scotland to break away from the Britain of the present. 
Indeed both Mr Brown and Ms Sturgeon argue that these values of the past—the shared 
values of common welfare—are also values for the future. They differ  profoundly only 
on the constitutional framework that might translate these values into policy.
So the claim discussed in this paper is that the common project of the British 
 welfare state is coming to an end, and that devolution and possible Scottish  independence 
are part of this erosion. Constitutional disintegration is not the only way in which the 
old welfare-state settlement has been undermined. There are many other ways in which 
common welfare and common citizenship seem to be treated now with some scepticism 
by the UK state—targeted benefits, growing inequality, social polarisation, withdrawal 
of the state from responsibility to be replaced by private responsibility (Taylor-Gooby 
2012). But the overarching guarantor of a common  citizenship achieved through com-
mon welfare was a state possessed in common throughout Britain. Therefore if  that 
weakens or ends, so—it is claimed—do the  projects of common social citizenship. In 
particular for this paper, education and common educational opportunities were at the 
heart of this project of common  welfare, in Britain as elsewhere. If educational prac-
tices depart too far from common principles, then education not only ceases to be a 
foundation of common social  citizenship, but in fact becomes a source of differentia-
tion. If young people in Scotland and in England are inducted into a different kind of 
society, then education itself  becomes a further source of divergence.
The paper is in three parts. It starts by looking at some examples of educational 
policy in more detail. Then it considers how we might understand what is meant by 
saying that the welfare state rested on common traditions, and considers academic 
rather than journalistic evidence relating to the question of whether the common 
 traditions are being eroded. It finishes by reconsidering the educational debates in the 
light of that evidence, and drawing some general conclusions about the relationship 
between political autonomy and social distinctiveness.
THREE EDUCATIONAL EXAMPLES
Three examples from education will illustrate the apparent divergence more clearly, in 
detail. They also show that, if  there is divergence, it is largely not because of anything 
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which Scotland (or Wales) has done but because of radical change in policy for 
England. In that sense, these examples would appear to confirm the Scottish nation-
alist claim that it is England or the UK state which has departed from the British 
values of the past. The three educational examples concern student finance in higher 
education, the structure of secondary schooling, and—perhaps most fundamentally 
of all—the school curriculum.
Student finance in higher education
The question of the ways in which the cost of taking a higher-education course is paid 
for is the best-known example of all the policy difference between Scotland and the 
rest of the UK. Crudely put, it is usually summed up as something like this: ‘students 
from Scotland at Scottish universities don’t pay fees while those from the rest of the 
UK do pay fees, wherever they go to university’. In more detail, but still glossing over 
many of the complications in order to concentrate on the essential political points, the 
background may be summarised quite straightforwardly (Barr 2012; Barr and 
Johnston 2010; Dearden, Goodman and Wyness 2012; Wakeling and Jefferies 2013). 
Following the Dearing review of higher education which reported in 1997, the Labour 
government introduced fees and ended grants. That was a radical departure from the 
policy which had been in place since the introduction of state grants for students in 
higher education in 1962. The new financial arrangement then became controversial 
during the first elections to the Scottish Parliament in 1999. Although Labour was the 
largest party there, the proportional electoral system led to there being a majority in 
the parliament against the new arrangements, and so Labour was forced to concede a 
further review of student finance as part of its negotiations with the Liberal Democrats 
to form a coalition government in Scotland. 
The result in Scotland was in effect a graduate tax—a loan to cover fees that was 
repayable after graduation at a rate related to salary. This applied to students  domiciled 
in Scotland at Scottish universities, and to rest-of-EU students because EU rules 
 prevent Scottish universities’ treating students from other member states differently 
from home students. But the new arrangements did not apply to students from the rest 
of the UK. It was thus Scottish Labour and the Scottish Liberal Democrats—not the 
nationalists—who inaugurated the different treatment of citizens of the same state. 
But the nationalists have not demurred.
The essential differences in student finance between Scotland and the rest of the 
UK have remained broadly the same ever since, through various further changes in 
England and Wales—the capping of fees for Welsh-domiciled students in Wales in 
2007, the UK Labour government’s increasing fees after 2006 in England, but their 
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replacement by the same kind of postgraduate tax-like repayment as in Scotland, and 
the UK coalition government’s removal of the cap on fees in England from 2012 
along with their introduction of a new system of bursaries and of repayment methods 
that the Liberal Democrats forced on their Conservative partners and that made the 
English arrangements now more redistributive than Labour’s regime before 2010, and 
more redistributive than the arrangements in Scotland (Chowdry et al. 2012). Whatever 
the complexities, the essence of the contrasts are not changed: Scottish students don’t 
pay, Welsh students don’t pay very much, and English students pay a lot.
One reason why this policy is the most visible of all the post-devolution divergence 
is cross-border flows of students, so that in university classes now in Scotland there 
are students paying nothing and students paying a great deal. Of course that has 
always been so, and is true also elsewhere in the UK, insofar as students from outside 
the European Union are charged very large fees, but the difference here is that the 
divergence is between citizens of the same state. The contrast is also symbolically 
exacerbated in Scotland by the fact that citizens from other EU states do not pay fees 
and so are now treated differently from citizens of the rest of the UK. That is another 
irony in the context of the referendum of 2014, since independence would force the 
same free treatment of students from the residual UK, which would then be a separate 
member state.
Whatever the complexities, this difference has now become so entrenched that the 
Scottish First Minister has famously said in a flight of Burnsian rhetoric in 2011 that 
the rocks would melt with the sun before he would preside over the introduction of 
fees for undergraduate higher education in Scotland (BBC 2011).
Structure of secondary schooling
The second example of educational divergence within the UK also stems from an 
innovation in English policy: the introduction of greater diversity in secondary school-
ing. This diversity is a departure in England from the system of common secondary 
schooling that was generally the outcome in all three British countries that stemmed 
from the 1960s moves to non-selective secondary schools in the public sector. This had 
never gone quite as far in England as in Wales or Scotland, insofar as some areas of 
England retained selective schools, and also insofar as the independent sector remained 
larger in England than in Scotland or Wales, and therefore offered more competition 
to public sector schools. But the deliberate creation of diversity in school provision in 
England that was started by the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and 
John Major was given a strong impetus under the Blair government, and has become 
the most visible education policy of the present UK government, articulated 
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 energetically and eloquently by the former Education Secretary Michael Gove. The 
stark contrast is then with both Wales and Scotland, which have done absolutely none 
of this. Scotland and Wales have still essentially a common structure of comprehen-
sive, non-selective secondary schools, not diversified in any way, with only small 
 independent sectors alongside them. 
The diversity of provision introduced by the Conservatives in the 1990s in England 
was limited essentially to the City Technology Colleges that were intended to strengthen 
technical education, in partnership with commercial finance, and these did not get 
very far because of a reluctance by both business and local government to develop 
them (Hatcher 2011; Machin & Vernoit 2011). The Conservatives responded by trying 
to develop specialist secondary schools which Labour embraced with enthusiasm. By 
the end of its first term in office, in 2001, around 20 per cent of English secondaries 
had become specialist, and in April of that year, during the general election campaign, 
Tony Blair said that there would be no limit on the number (Paterson 2003). Now 
almost all secondary schools in England have a specialism (West & Bailey 2013: 148).
The development of academy schools outside the local authority sector was an 
even stronger challenge to the previous uniformity of provision. They were described 
by the Department for Education and Employment in 2000 as ‘part of a wider pro-
gramme to extend diversity within the state sector’ which were related to new forms of 
governance, ‘allowing new schools to be established within the state sector, . . .  allowing 
existing private schools to become part of the publicly-provided education system, 
. . . [and] allowing new promoters from the voluntary, religious or business sectors to 
take over weak schools or replace them with City Academies’ (quoted by Hatcher 
2011: 486). That policy already took the structure of secondary schooling in quite 
 different directions from those in Scotland and Wales.
Michael Gove’s policy of ‘free schools’ went even more radically in that same 
direction (Hatcher 2011). These are publicly funded schools that are not managed by 
the local authority and that are in principle almost as free from central control as 
independent schools: they are not required to follow the national curriculum, may 
decide (within limits) which pupils to admit, and are not bound by national standards 
of staffing. Mr Gove borrowed the ideas from Sweden, where somewhat similar 
schools were enabled during a brief  period in the mid-1990s of a government led by 
conservative parties; that reform in Sweden was not rescinded by the social democrats 
when they came back to power (Lindbom 2001; Lidström 1999).
This whole programme of radical diversity of schools in England has been 
 criticised by writers on the left as the end of the ideals of common educational provi-
sion that were the founding ideas of common schooling. For example, Beck described 
Mr Gove as holding ‘a profoundly anti-statist ideology, that includes an attempt to 
complete Margaret Thatcher’s work of radically marginalising any local government 
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presence in education’. The programme, Beck argues, ‘aims . . . to create a new 
 “common sense” that uncritically accepts that neoliberal modes of governing are 
 natural . . . or inevitable in the modern world’ (Beck 2012: 9, 11). 
So the apparently sharp divide between policy for the structure of secondary 
schooling in England on the one hand and policy in Scotland and Wales on the other 
seems, as with the question of university student fees, to bring the common principles 
of the original welfare state to an end.
School curriculum
Despite all the controversy surrounding secondary-school structures and higher edu-
cation fees, perhaps the deepest changes are happening in connection with what is 
being taught in schools, and these certainly lead to the appearance of the sharpest 
philosophical disagreements between the direction of education policy in Scotland 
and that in England. On the whole, this is an area where the differences only really 
became significant when Michael Gove became Education Secretary. 
Mr Gove was determined to distance himself  from all recent curriculum policy in 
England, and was determined to restore what he sees as a traditional curriculum based 
on subjects and on rigour. He said in 2010, for example, that ‘the great tradition of 
our literature—Dryden, Pope, Swift, Byron, Keats, Shelley, Austen, Dickens and 
Hardy—should be at the heart of school life’. In 2008, before becoming a minister, he 
described this approach as based on the emancipating power of knowledge:
knowledge is the mother, father and midwife of understanding—totally indispensable. 
For those who grow up in homes rich in knowledge, where conversation is laced with 
learning and childhood curiosity is easily satisfied, future learning is made easier, 
deeper understanding comes more readily. . . . [W]ith the abandonment of subject 
 disciplines, the poorer lose out again. (Gove 2008: 24)
He described the pedagogical philosophy that he rejects as ‘Progressivism, or 
Constructivism or Child-Centred Education,’ ‘championed [he adds] in different ways, 
with different emphases, at different times, by John Dewey, by Jean Piaget, by Lady 
Plowden and by successive Department of Education luminaries’. ‘What has united 
the followers of this ideology,’ he argued, was ‘hostility towards traditional, academic, 
fact-rich, knowledge-centred, subject-based, teacher-led education’ (Gove 2008: 20).
That signals a radical departure, but what makes Mr Gove’s reforms particularly 
relevant to the debate here is that policy on the curriculum in Scotland is moving in 
quite the opposite direction from Mr Gove’s favouring of a traditional curriculum. 
There is almost complete consensus on this in Scotland across the political spectrum, 
and embracing most shades of professional opinion and of opinion among academic 
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commentators (Paterson 2014; Priestley & Humes 2010). The Scottish reforms are 
called the ‘Curriculum for Excellence’, and the general principles are described 
 officially as entailing that ‘the child or young person is at the centre of learning 
 provision’ (Scottish Government 2008: 22). The aim is not directly to instil knowledge: 
‘the purpose of the curriculum is to enable the child or young person to develop the 
“four capacities” ’, by which are meant becoming ‘successful learners, confident 
 individuals, responsible citizens, and effective contributors’. The curriculum frame-
work ‘sets out what a child or young person should be able to do and the experiences 
that contribute to their learning, rather than detailed definitions of content or 
 prescribed hours of study’ (Scottish Government 2008: 5).
Priestley & Humes (2010: 355) describe the Scottish approach as ‘a process curric-
ulum’, characterised by aiming for ‘individual growth and intrinsic purposes’, as 
opposed to purposes set by, for example, the nature of knowledge or the needs of the 
economy. Michael Young—doyen of curriculum studies in England—draws the 
explicit comparison between this and what is happening in England. In the emerging 
Scottish approach, he says, ‘the teacher becomes a facilitator of learning and the 
 distinctiveness of the pedagogic relationship between teachers and pupils in providing 
students with access to specialist knowledge is played down’. This is, Young adds, 
‘what Gove and his colleagues see themselves as combating; hence his enthusiasm for 
returning to the past’ (Young 2011: 268).
Not surprisingly, in the light of this, Mr Gove fell out spectacularly with the 
 dominant academic opinion in England. Young, commenting further on the construc-
tivist philosophy underlying Curriculum for Excellence, makes the point in explicitly 
political terms: ‘with its emphasis on access and participation,’ he says, ‘and its 
 confidence in claiming that no form of knowledge is necessarily more reliable than 
any other, it appears progressive and democratic and has been seen as attractive, in its 
less extreme forms, on the Left and among some researchers in educational studies’ 
(Young 2011: 269). Implicitly following such a line in their criticism of Mr Gove, 100 
education academics wrote a letter to The Independent newspaper in 2013 alleging that 
the new English ‘curriculum consists of endless lists of spellings, facts and rules. This 
mountain of data will not develop children’s ability to think, including problem- 
solving, critical understanding and creativity’ (The Independent 20 March 2013). Mr 
Gove responded with his characteristic sarcasm, describing the signatories as  criticising 
‘the [UK Government] Coalition for our indefensibly reactionary drive to get more 
children to spell properly, use a wider vocabulary and learn their times tables’ (Gove 
2013). The rudeness of that had previously been prefigured by an equally ad hominem 
attack from one of Mr Gove’s many academic critics on the left, the philosopher John 
White: ‘we know [that Mr Gove] adored the traditional fare he got at his Aberdeen 
grammar school, but only an education minister one tree short of an arboretum would 
impose a personal preference on a whole nation’ (White 2011).
 Education and Opportunity: Is the UK departing from a common tradition? 109
We shall return to this, since White gets his history of Scottish education wrong, 
but the serious point amidst the political bluster is the philosophical difference between 
(to put it too starkly) a knowledge-centred and a child-centred curriculum, between 
Matthew Arnold’s view of liberal education as passing on the best that has been 
thought and said—a view praised by Mr Gove—and John Dewey’s view that shifting 
the curriculum’s centre of attention from the teacher to the child was as profound a 
change in its own way as that brought about by Copernicus (Dewey 1915: 35). If  devo-
lution has enabled such sharp differences to emerge between these two neighbouring 
systems of education, then surely—it might reasonably be supposed—it has destroyed 
the once common educational project of the welfare state.
WELFARE STATE AND COMMON TRADITIONS
That, then, is the evidence for disintegration of policy in education. How now might 
we understand the claim that devolution is threatening the very foundation of the 
welfare state? The premises here are that the British idea of social citizenship rested 
on common traditions of social thought, and that education was the heart of that. 
These premises are indeed plausible. There are two strands to this, both directly related 
to the nature of the education systems: the first aspect is a universal structure of 
opportunity; the second is a certain kind of universalism of learning.
The structure of opportunity
In a report published in 1947, the Scottish Advisory Council on Education  commended 
what later came to be called comprehensive education but which in those days in 
Scotland was usually referred to as the omnibus school: ‘the case for the omnibus 
school is that this is the natural way for a democracy to order the post-primary 
 education of a given area’ (Scottish Education Department 1947: 36). Among the 
civic advantages which the Council saw was the manner in which a school educating 
the whole community could contribute to ‘inculcating the community virtues’.
A belief  that providing a common set of opportunities would create a democratic 
culture was then one of the several reasons why a pattern of common secondary 
schooling came to be the preferred mode of secondary-school organisation through-
out Britain by the 1960s. Anthony Crosland, for example, argued in 1956 in The Future 
of Socialism that ‘if  the state provides schools and hospitals, teachers and doctors, on 
a generous scale and of a really high quality . . . then the result will be, not indeed a 
greater equality of real incomes, but certainly a greater equality in manners and the 
texture of social life’ (Crosland 1956: 85). In particular, he argued later, comprehen-
sive schooling ought to be justified ‘in terms of a sense of community, of social 
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 cohesion, of a nation composed of people who understand each other because they 
can communicate’ (Crosland 1974: 204).
These are the local political expressions of a principle that has been described by 
Boli et al. (1985) as universalistic individualism. It was about individual opportunity, 
but was universal in that it sought to make a reality of the liberal claim that everyone 
is equal. There are three aspects of the way in which this rested on a shared British 
state. First, as in many other places, the state expanded education, and achieved new 
political legitimacy in the era of mass democracy by doing so. Second, educational 
growth strengthened nation building, again as elsewhere but with the complication in 
Britain that it involved three distinct nations nested within a larger one. Thus through 
sanctioning the democratisation of education systems that remained distinctive in the 
separate parts of Britain, the newly democratic British state found a new way of 
 showing British identity to be complementary to the other national identities, not 
antagonistic to them. Then the third role for education underpinning universalistic 
individualism is an overarching liberalism. Mass education has been the link between 
politics and the individual in the very construction and definition of what Ramirez 
and Boli (1987: 10) call ‘the European model of a national society’. The British state, 
then (to paraphrase these authors) was the guardian of all the nations that constitute 
Britain by being a guarantor of individual progress through education.
Individual opportunity, the argument goes, evoked a common British identity 
because it was believed that the opportunity depended on the welfare project of the 
British state, depended, that is, on the universalism which the very concept of ‘Britain’ 
seemed then—till about the 1960s—still to embody. So if  the structure of opportunity 
is no longer essentially the same throughout Britain, then one of the pillars of the 
British welfare state is weakened.
Universalism of learning
These common opportunities were not only about structures, however. They were also 
about what is learnt, about the common culture which a common education system 
was supposed to bring about. That view was recurrent and strong among those people 
whose influence led throughout the first half  of the 20th century to the fully developed 
welfare state of the post-war period—indeed was strong earlier than the belief  in 
 common structures of opportunity, which was not widely held on the political left 
until the 1950s with thinkers such as Crosland.
Harold Laski—socialist intellectual and professor at the London School of 
Economics—wrote in 1923, for example, that ‘we have made the electorate commen-
surate with the majority of the adult population, but we have failed, in any creative 
sense, to fit that electorate to grasp either its responsibilities or its powers’, which 
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would require that the average person ‘be trained to feel a moral responsibility for the 
results of the political process’ (Laski 1923: 50). To that end, the most effective means 
was immersion in a tradition: 
for what, in the handling of  material, it is essential for the student to encounter is the 
great mind which has formed the civilised tradition. He will rarely find it easy to 
wrestle with; but he will gain infinitely more from surmounting the difficulties of the 
supreme book than by digesting a second-hand summary of what the supreme book 
contains. (Laski 1930: 97)
Percy Nunn, the influential professor of education at the Institute of Education in 
London, noted in 1920 that ‘the strongest opponents of vocational training are among 
those who speak for labour,’ and explained this by their ‘claim for the poor the  heritage 
of  culture from which they have so long been unjustly excluded’ (Nunn 1920: 204). 
R.H. Tawney, admirer of Nunn and the person with greatest claim to have shaped 
Labour’s education policy as it moved towards consolidating and extending the 
 welfare state, argued that ‘no one can be fully at home in the world’ without acquain-
tance with the cultural traditions of society, in which he included ‘literature and art, 
the history of society and the revelations of science’ (Tawney 1964 [1953]: 88). James 
Chuter Ede, the Labour MP who spoke for the party on education in the 1930s, who 
was co-author (with the Conservative Minister of Education, R.A. Butler) of the 
wartime coalition’s Education Act of 1944, and who was Home Secretary in the 1945 
Labour Government, wrote in 1929 that
if  we are to have a democracy capable of shouldering th[e] great burden [of responsi-
bility for decisions that used to be relegated to the few], I am quite sure that it can only 
be done through giving to the children of all classes of the community a greater 
opportunity of entering into those great heritages of literature, of art and of beauty 
that should enrich the lives of the community. (Quoted by Barker 1972: 139–40)
The culture which all these reforming political thinkers admired was not a particular 
culture, not a class culture or any other kind of sectional culture. There was no inkling 
of relativism among the social democratic and liberal reformers who created the 
 welfare state, absolutely no sense that the best that has been thought and said was 
anything other than the basis of the first truly common culture to be created deliber-
ately through education. The inherited intellectual culture, they believed, could 
 provide all the ideas needed to reform capitalist society even in the most fundamental 
ways.
To sum up the delicate balance that was sought between tradition and change, 
consider A.D. Lindsay, founder (in 1949–51) of the innovatory University of Keele, 
philosopher, socialist, political activist, and in 1938 anti-appeasement parliamentary 
candidate in a by-election in Oxford (which he nearly won)—yet steeped in the past, 
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in the traditions of Scottish religious thought, as Master of Balliol, and as Vice-
Chancellor of the University of Oxford. Lindsay said that ‘the problem [is] this 
 conception of a standard which was corrigible and progressive, creative and authori-
tative’ (Lindsay 1950: 145). So the socialist and philosopher—and Scot—Lindsay 
sought radical inspiration in the tradition of English poetry just as surely as Mr Gove 
does today:
an understanding and appreciation of English poetry, of its history and its relations 
to the history of English culture, is a far more effective way of teaching a common 
outlook on the world, and a common understanding of our heritage, than a technical 
instruction in Philosophy. (Scott 1971: 370)
These founders of the idea of the welfare state were all then of Matthew Arnold’s view 
that people ‘of culture are the true apostles of equality,’ that ‘the best that has been 
thought and said’ would enable us—in the often forgotten second half  of that 
 sentence—‘through this knowledge [to turn] a stream of fresh and free thought on our 
stock notions and habits’ (Arnold 1960 [1869]: 6). So to undermine a common culture 
in whatever way—to define the common curriculum in such a radically different way 
as is now happening between Scotland and England—is to destroy a common  heritage, 
a belief  in which lay at the heart of the development of universal education in the 
middle of the 20th century.
THE COUNTER ARGUMENT
Yet there is a paradox in all this legacy of social democratic thinking. The common 
culture in which these old socialists believed is very similar to the common culture that 
the radical Tory Michael Gove wanted to introduce in England. Should that  particular 
point about one of these policy differences not at least give us pause for thought? 
Might the differences of policy that we have noticed not be in fact really variations on 
common themes, the differences exaggerated by the rhetoric of politics, and mistaken 
for profound change (by too credulous journalistic and some academic commenta-
tors)? Might the difference be about means rather than ends, and indeed might these 
differences of means be not much greater now than they have often been in the 
pre-devolutionary past, when Scotland already had, through administrative auton-
omy, distinctive universities, and a pattern of secondary schooling that was somewhat 
more comprehensive than that in England?
One of the striking features of the whole constitutional debate about Scotland’s 
place in Britain is how little public values differ between Scotland and the rest of Britain. 
Take for example what the British Social Attitudes Survey tells us about  attitudes to the 
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welfare state. In 2010, the proportions agreeing that the government should redistribute 
wealth were 41per cent in Scotland and 34 per cent in England:1 a difference, true, but 
hardly great enough, one would have thought, to undermine the very  structure of the 
state, and only a minority in favour of redistribution in each country.
The same is the case with other topics. The proportion hostile to the welfare state 
on the grounds that it weakens communities—in the sense of believing that the  welfare 
state discourages people from helping each other—was 29 per cent in Scotland and 40 
per cent in England, a difference again, certainly, but in both countries a minority.2 
The proportion not very sympathetic to the unemployed—in the sense of believing 
that they could find work if  they tried—was around one half  in each country: lower 
in Scotland (at 46 per cent) than in England (55 per cent) but again not qualitatively 
different.3 The proportion nevertheless looking back with some pride on the welfare 
state, and agreeing that it was one of Britain’s proudest achievements, was almost 
identical: 49 per cent in Scotland and 52 per cent in England.4 These differences, 
though generally placing Scotland on average to the left of England, are not so huge 
as to signal a fundamental gulf  of social values.
We can see this all the more clearly if  we look at some measures of attitudes 
towards democracy and the state across Europe, as recorded by the European Social 
Survey.5 In 2012, that Survey found that the proportion believing that democracy in 
their state worked well was 86 per cent in the UK, almost identical in England (where 
it was 87 per cent) and Scotland (where it was 84 per cent).6 By contrast, the range 
across Europe was from the mid-90s in the Scandinavian states, and around 90 per 
cent in Germany and the Netherlands, through 70 per cent in Spain, to 54 per cent in 
Russia. Thus Scotland and England were both near the top end of this scale.
In the 2004 European Social Survey, the percentage believing that state benefits 
could create a more equal society was 45 per cent in Scotland and 41 per cent in 
England, but the range was far wider elsewhere: from around 66 per cent in Scandinavia, 
through about the same in Germany as in Britain, to 32 per cent in the Czech Republic 
and 14 per cent in Hungary.7 We shall look at some other more specifically educa-
tional attitudes below, but the main point to make here is that, though there is some 
1 BSAS 2010 data set from UK Data Service, Study Number 6969. Variable REDISTRB. Percentages are 
weighted; unweighted sample sizes are 273 (Scotland) and 2,360 (England).
2 See above, n. 1. Variable WELFHELP.
3 See above, n. 1. Variable UNEMPJOB.
4 See above, n. 1. Variable PROUDWLF.
5 Data from European Social Survey web site, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/.
6 Variable DMCNTOV, percentage scoring 5–10 on a 10-point scale. Percentages are weighted; unweighted 
sample sizes are 173 (Scotland) and 1,515 (England). Sample sizes in other countries were between about 
1,800 and 2,200.
7 See above, nn. 5 and 6. Variable SBEQSOC.
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basis for the political claim that Scotland is to the left of England, the differences are 
not so great as to indicate a profound territorial rupture in social values.
More generally, we still live essentially in the world of the Enlightenment. 
Throughout Europe, what purport to be national values are actually just the local 
translation of what Joppke calls ‘the universal creed of liberty and equality that marks 
all liberal societies . . . the universal, nationally anonymous creed of the liberal state’ 
(Joppke 2004: 253–4). All that differs is language and accent: ‘the various national 
labels are only different names for the same thing, the liberal creed of liberty and 
equality’. Thus in the European Social Survey we find general agreement on some 
basic principles of liberal society. For example, there is very clear majority agreement 
in 2012 with the propositions that ‘people should be treated equally’ and have ‘equal 
opportunities in life’—between about 66 and 80 per cent agreeing in almost all coun-
tries.8 Even stronger is the agreement that it is important ‘to live in a country that is 
governed democratically’—almost all countries have agreement proportions between 
90 and 95 per cent.9 Both Scotland and England share in this common European 
liberalism.
If part of these common values is what is referred to as globalisation—the pene-
tration of the free market everywhere—then that is not new either. Liberalism has 
always been both emancipatory and potentially oppressive because standardising, 
and education in the service of liberal universalism can seem to the particularist to be 
what the Irish nationalist Padraig Pearse called an imperial ‘murder machine’ (Lyons 
1973: 652). Consider John Stuart Mill—great Victorian liberal, hero of the left ever 
since, admired everywhere still today for his pioneering concern with human rights, 
notably the rights of women. Consider how Mill expressed the claims of liberal 
modernity rather unashamedly, writing in 1861:
nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French 
Navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilized 
and cultivated people—to be a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal 
terms to all the privileges of French citizenship, sharing the advantages of French 
protection, and the dignity and prestige of French power—than to sulk on his own 
rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, with-
out participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The same remark 
applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as members of the British nation.
(Mill 1861: chap. 16)
We might note, too, that statistical measurement and therefore educational research 
are themselves part of this standardisation, implying—in the words of Theodore 
8 See above, nn. 5 and 6. Variable IPEQOPT.
9 See above, nn. 5 and 6. Variable LVDTC.
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Porter—‘the subordination of personal interests and prejudices to public standards’ 
(Porter 1995: 74). Using statistics to create norms conflates the idea of normal as a 
criterion with normal as a description of a state of affairs: ‘the normal’, in a comment 
by Ian Hacking about Comte, ‘as existing average [and] as figure of perfection to 
which we may progress’ (Hacking 1990: 168). Originally—in the period of 19th- 
century development of statistics about which Porter and Hacking were writing— 
statistical standardisation was a national project, but it is now much more than that. 
As Grek has noted in connection with the OECD’s Programme for International 
Student Assessment, ‘evaluations of national education and training systems require 
 inter national points of comparison,’ which—as she points out—is a transfer to the 
international level of the standardisation which the very invention of statistics as an 
agency of the state originally brought about internally: ‘statistics and numbers which 
elide the local are . . . important to the construction . . . of a commensurable education 
policy field’ (Grek 2009: 25). 
We might then ask whether the three examples that we looked at of education 
policy within the UK are in fact as straightforwardly to be interpreted as evidence of 
radical divergence as may have appeared plausible. On the question first of student 
finance, if  we take the point of comparison to be opportunity rather than mechanisms 
of opportunity, the conclusion from careful research is that the differences in the 
regimes of fees and of student support have no effect on the outcomes, and thus no 
effect on the deeper matter of opportunities or denial of opportunities. Nicholas Barr, 
for example, has noted that ‘a widespread and central argument was that variable fees 
would deter students from poorer backgrounds, making higher education even more 
the province of the rich’. But, he notes (from UCAS data), ‘that has not happened’. 
There is no evidence that the much-noticed difference in student finance between 
Scotland and England has led to any differences in social-class inequality of access: 
thus between 2002 and 2008, as Barr points out, ‘applications in England [from] the 
bottom three socioeconomic groups rose by 6.5 per cent [annually], compared with 
0.5 per cent in Scotland, 3.1 per cent in Northern Ireland and 3.7 per cent in Wales 
(Barr 2010: 14, 17). Though the differences of student finance are greater than at any 
time since 1962, they were much larger in the interwar period, at a time when the 
Union was far more secure than it is today: grants from the Carnegie Trust enabled 
many able young Scots of limited means to attend university when their counterparts 
in England had only very restricted access to bursaries of any kind (Anderson 2006: 
92 and 118).
Despite the changes brought about by the Scottish Parliament, there is little differ-
ence in public attitudes on this matter. The level of support for means-tested fees is 
similar in Scotland and in England: in the 2010 British Social Attitudes Survey, it was 
63 per cent in Scotland and 70 per cent in England, and indeed Scotland became 
slightly less favourable to the current Scottish policy in the decade following its intro-
duction: in 2000, 57 per cent favoured means-tested fees (thus 6 points higher in 
2010).10 More directly relevant to the underlying principles of opportunity is the quite 
close agreement between opinion in Scotland and opinion in England on whether 
opportunities to enter higher education should be expanded: in 2010, 43 per cent in 
Scotland, 35 per cent in England, each similar to 2004 and about five points less than 
in 1999.11 This difference between Scotland and England is again a difference of degree 
rather than of  fundamental social ethos.
On the structure of secondary schooling, the effect on opportunity is not in fact 
the major factor that it was once thought to be. On the whole, the structure of a 
school system—even the presence or absence of selection—seems to make little 
 difference to outcomes, whether these are achievement in examinations, social 
 mobility, or civic values (Boliver & Swift 2011; Kerckhoff et al. 1996; Paterson 2013). 
Comprehensive education neither raises nor harms attainment when compared to 
selective school systems; neither makes people more civic-minded nor diminishes their 
engagement with society.
Again, research on school structures contributes to the common fundamental 
principles, as with the international statistical comparison of nominally independent 
countries. Even where radically different structures are being introduced, the criteria 
used to evaluate them—for example the evaluation of academies in England by 
Machin & Vernoit (2011)—are the same as for comprehensive schools, and the same 
as they have been since, say, A.H. Halsey or J.W.B. Douglas and colleagues carried 
out their research on the operation of the old selective school system in the 1950s (for 
example, Douglas et al. 1966; Floud & Halsey 1957). Implicit in this common frame-
work of analysis is a common epistemological framework, and therefore also a com-
mon ethical framework. Thus when the critics of English academies question whether 
Machin & Vernoit have adequately controlled for selection bias, they are accepting in 
principle that such schools are part of the same framework of understanding as any 
other kind of school. To engage in this debate at all on statistical grounds is to accept 
that the variation in policy—radical though it may be—is taking place on top of a 
ground of agreement about the importance of opportunity, and about how to mea-
sure it. Political debate implicitly rests on that common ground too. When a politician 
says that ‘education [i]s the only reliable means of realising a young person’s potential’ 
or ‘education is the key to social mobility’, or ‘schools should be engines of social 
10 For 2010, see above, n. 1; variable HEDFEE. British Social Attitudes Survey 2000 has UK Data Service 
Study Number 4486.
11 For 2010, see above, n. 1; variable HEDOPP. British Social Attitudes Survey 2004 has UK Data Service 
Study Number 5329, and 1999 has Study Number 4318.
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mobility’, there is no clue within the rhetoric as to which side of the debate that  person 
is on, nor indeed as to whether they are speaking about Scotland or England.12
Any differences in public views about school structures go back to before the 
Scottish Parliament was created in 1999: if  the stronger support for comprehensive 
education in Scotland than in England contributes to the fragility of the Union, then 
it is not to be attributed to devolution, but developed in the 1980s (for example, see 
Brown et al. (1999: 96–107), using the British Election Surveys of 1997, 1979 and 
1974). Moreover, on most matters attitudes concerning school structures are little 
more favourable in England than in Scotland to private firms or charities running 
schools. In the 2007 British Social Attitudes Survey, the proportion in favour of 
 private companies running schools was 17 per cent in Scotland and 20 per cent in 
England. For charities running schools, the proportion in favour was 30 per cent in 
Scotland and 37 per cent in England.13 There is not much evidence here of fundamen-
tal divergence between Scotland and England so far as the ways in which schools 
relate to society politically are concerned.
Then on the curriculum we are back to the irony that we have already briefly seen, 
that Mr Gove is closer to the dominant tradition of liberal education than his critics, 
and thus closer also to his left-wing critics’ predecessors half  a century or more ago 
than they are. He does indeed—as we noted John White saying—conscientiously draw 
upon his own school experience in Aberdeen, but Mr Gove’s critics on the political left 
rather neglect the social purpose to which that old Scottish academic curriculum was 
put. In the words of Guy Neave, writing around the time when Mr Gove was at school: 
in most Western countries the distinction between ‘academic’ and non academic 
courses is regarded as one of the major historic obstacles to a democratic  system of 
education. In Scotland, the reverse is true. The concept of a curriculum dominated by 
a highly academic content has been justified in the name of creating a ‘common 
course’ for all. (Neave 1976: 131)
In truth then, the apparent contrast in the cultural meaning of different approaches 
to the curriculum is less significant than that there are multiple interpretations of a 
common tradition. The Scottish tradition which Neave notes, and to which such a 
pre-eminently British academic leader as A.D. Lindsay was heir in the first half  of the 
20th century, was part of a common current of ideas about liberal education that, in 
both England and Scotland, owed its main debt to Matthew Arnold and, further 
12 The two social mobility quotations are respectively from Tristram Hunt (28 Oct 2013) and Michael 
Gove (Department for Education, 2010: 6); Hunt speaks for Labour on education in England. The one 
about realising potential is from Michael Russell (27 March 2013), Cabinet Secretary for Education in 
the Scottish Government.
13 BSAS 2007 data set from UK Data Service, Study Number 6240. Variables SCHPRV and SCHVOL. 
Percentages are weighted; unweighted sample sizes are 189 (Scotland) and 1,741 (England).
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back, to the classical tradition as renovated from the Renaissance onwards (Rothblatt, 
2007). Variation in how that tradition was interpreted was about means, not ends, as 
it is still today. Being part of this liberal tradition, too, Mr Gove is not the reactionary 
traditionalist that his critics allege: as Michael Young has pointed out, ‘Gove has 
claimed that his approach is based on the principle of equality. In the sense that he is 
proposing a common “curriculum for all” he is right’ (Young 2011: 275). Young 
 continues: ‘to the extent that a subject-based curriculum is based on concepts, not 
facts alone, it is not only a reproducer of inequalities, but also potentially a carrier of 
universal knowledge—knowledge that is not dependent for its validity on its social 
origins or when or how it was produced’ (Young 2011: 276). There would probably be 
nothing there with which Mr Gove would disagree, and undoubtedly he has  repeatedly 
acknowledged the importance of concepts built on a secure foundation of knowledge 
about facts, and has never said that all he wants is facts. He wrote in 2008 on the 
 relationship of knowledge to ideas that ‘we learn by using existing knowledge to 
 construct models, parallels, paradigms and analogies which enable us to grasp new 
concepts and insights’ (Gove 2008: 24). But, as Young’s comments here exemplify, 
some of Mr Gove’s critics are not the unthinking ideologues that he alleges, and some 
of them remember the history of left-wing support for a liberal education as the 
 welfare state was being established.
More to the point for our present discussion, the new Scottish curriculum is 
 perhaps better thought of as a reform of pedagogical methods than necessarily an 
abandonment of knowledge or of the traditions of intellectual enquiry. Alongside the 
constructivist ideas which we noted as tending to break down inherited structures of 
knowledge, the Curriculum for Excellence principles also include judgements such as 
this commendation of disciplinary knowledge:
subjects are an essential feature of the curriculum, particularly in secondary school. 
They provide an important and familiar structure for knowledge, offering a context 
for specialists to inspire, stretch and motivate. (Scottish Government 2008: 20)
The old predilection for the academic curriculum in Scotland will not vanish by min-
isterial fiat, and what actually will happen in Scotland will thus depend on practice, on 
the ‘specialists’ cited but not explained in that quotation. Trusting the teachers, which 
Curriculum for Excellence does, must mean also trusting those who choose an 
approach to knowledge as traditional as Mr Gove’s.
So the Scottish approach allows for Mr Gove’s, just as it is a caricature to reduce 
his ideas to a mechanical philistinism. Both approaches are really elements of the 
always evolving tradition of liberal education. As Sheldon Rothblatt once noted 
(1976: 199):
the phrase ‘a liberal education’ . . . enjoys an extraordinary continuity and has  survived 
each of the revolutions that should have disposed of it. . . . The words continue to 
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exercise a hold on the imagination, and scarcely any educational change of significant 
proportions is undertaken without reference to some aspect of its history, 
the  common element being, in some form, the belief  that ‘liberal education [is] the 
pathway to  civilisation’ (Rothblatt 1976: 23).
CONCLUSIONS
Three points might be made in conclusion. The first is that there are far more 
 continuities of culture, of opportunity, and of liberal ideas than the rhetoric of  politics 
sometimes indicates (Raffe 2004). By this is meant continuities not only over space, 
though there are indeed greater similarities of social philosophy in the parts of Britain 
than is usually supposed, as we have seen. If  Scotland secedes, it will not be directly 
because the country has a fundamentally different social philosophy from England. 
The continuities are also over time, and they help to consolidate the sense of a  common 
culture. The values that led to the welfare state, and the values that underpinned a 
common system of education, continue to be strong. That is not because of anything 
specifically to do with Britishness, but rather because these values are part of the 
 common culture of universalistic individualism that is found across the developed 
world.
The second point is about research. Research itself  contributes to this process of 
standardisation, in that in order to compare social groups it has to create common 
categories in terms of which to compare. The only way in which we could prevent an 
impact from research on the maintenance of common criteria would be if  we kept our 
results secret. So the inclination of academics to engage in public debate is itself  a 
contribution to processes of standardisation.
The final point is that none of this really has much to say about the future of 
Britain as a constitutional entity. Scottish independence could happen without dis-
turbing these commonalities, just as social values can be quite similar among 
Scandinavian countries, or indeed between them and other places, as we noted in 
passing earlier from the European Social Survey. The UK may be departing from 
common traditions so far as politics and specific policies are concerned—the means 
of social philosophy—but for the social traditions that really matter it would take 
much more than the ephemera of politics or even the accident of constitutional 
change to bring to an end the shared history of values, ideas, and principles.
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